Foucault News

News and resources on French thinker Michel Foucault (1926-1984)

Erin Quinn, “Surveillance” ,
Centre for Creative Practices in Pembroke Street, Dublin,
August 2010

From The Irish Times 2010
[…] Quinn drills home the manner in which we are relentlessly watched on screen. Her photographs and footage deal with the increased surveillance of public, work and private spaces in modern life. Quinn takes airports as her case study. She spent a year in Dublin airport, photographing passengers from the top-down perspective of a CCTV camera. At first the photographs strike the viewer as exceptionally normal, with the graphic details of the figures’ clothing or baggage set off against a bland background. On further inspection they’re more troubling, insidious…
Her airport sessions were inspired by French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-84), particularly his studies of 18th-century designs for a “Panopticon”. […]

Alain Beaulieu, ‘Towards a liberal Utopia: The connection between Foucault’s reporting on the Iranian Revolution and the ethical turn’, Philosophy Social Criticism September 2010, vol. 36 no. 7, 801-818
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453710372065

Abstract
The shift in Foucault’s work from genealogy to ethics finds consensus among Foucault scholars. However, the motivations behind this transition remain either misunderstood or understudied in large part. Foucault’s recently published or soon-to-be translated 1977/—9 lectures (published as Security, Territory, Population and as The Birth of Biopolitics) offer new elements for understanding this dense and uncharted period along Foucault’s itinerary. In this article, the author argues that Foucault’s interpretation of the liberal tradition, which is at the core of the 1977—9 lectures, must be examined in combination with Foucault’s other major interests in the late 1970s, namely the Iranian Revolution and Kant. The discovery of spirituality (Iran), the valorization of an autonomous subject (Kant) and the call for a tolerant environment towards minority practices (liberalism) pave the way for the later Foucault’s ethics, which are grounded in spiritual exercises and means of liberating the subject.

Foucault, the Family & Politics
Friday, 12 November 2010
Location: King’s College, Keynes Hall
Registration for this conference is free.

Conveners
Robbie Duschinsky (Sociology, University of Cambridge)
Dr Jude Browne (Gender Studies, University of Cambridge)
Dr Deborah Thom (History, University of Cambridge)

Foucault writes of how the internal power-dynamics of the family interact with the social politics of society as a whole. On the one hand, social politics impact family structure and dynamics in many ways, including legal judgements, medical interventions, and social work. On the other hand, members of families call on discourses and institutions from society at large in order to manage or change the operation of the family. The conference will begin by examining the theme of the family in Foucault’s life and texts; it will then use his ideas to explore the politics of the family more generally in the contemporary world.

Tell, Dave. “Rhetoric and Power: An Inquiry into Foucault’s Critique of Confession.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 43.2 (Spring 2010): 95-117. Lead Article.
https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.43.2.0095

Abstract
In the 1980s Foucault relentlessly distinguished between two discursive practices: the Christian confession and the ancient technologies of the self. This distinction provides a valuable opportunity to study the role of rhetoric in Foucault’s thought—not because both discursive practices are rhetorical forms, but, curiously, because Foucault insisted that one is not. By contextualizing both of these discourses of the self in terms of Nietzsche’s critique of metonymy, I argue that Foucault’s distinction between the confession and the technologies of the self teaches us two important lessons about rhetoric and power. First, because Foucault’s power requires recourse to a metonymically figured confession, it is a fundamentally rhetorical power. Second, to the extent that the “political indispensability” of the techniques of the self is tied to their rejection of metonymy, Foucault’s resistance is “nonrhetorical.”

The proceedings of the Congresso Nacional de Psicanálise, Direito e Literatura: estética da existência (the National Congress of Psychoanalysis, Law and Literature: aesthetics of existence) convened by Fábio Belo in Brazil in 2009 have just been published.
August 2025. No working links available

Introduction in Portuguese
“Êthopoien, quer dizer: fazer o êthos, produzir o êthos, modificar, transformar o êthos, a maneira de ser, o modo de existência de um indivíduo. Aquilo que é êthopoiosé alguma coisa que tem a qualidade de transformar o modo de ser de um indivíduo.” (Foucault, L’Herméneutique du Sujet, p. 227).

Essa definição de etopoético já responde à nossa questão. É bastante evidente que o direito é um saber etopoético. Resta, no entanto, pesquisar como se estabelecem as modificações perpetradas pelo direito na vida de cada um de nós.

Casos mais visíveis como a luta por direitos de “minorias” são exemplos muito potentes do caráter etopoético do campo jurídico. Pensemos nas conquistas das mulheres, dos negros, dos homossexuais, apenas para ficarmos nos mais recentes.

Claro, não se pode dizer que é apenas através do direito que as parcerias homoeróticas vão fazer valer seus direitos civis. Tamém não é por decreto que as mulheres entram no campo do trabalho ou dirimem a dominação masculina. E, certamente, não será apenas pela invenção de leis que o racismo e suas consequências vão desaparecer. Mas, parece-nos impossível que essas lutas não passem pelo campo jurídico. Afinal, a questão da parceria homoafetiva sempre vai esbarrar nos entraves da lei: a adoção, a herança, os benefícios do cônjuge… A mulher muitas vezes também terá que recorrer às leis que não só garantem seu acesso ao trabalho e à cidadania, mas também a protegem da possível violência contra ela. E o negro se valerá dos recursos jurídicos – das leis contra o racismo às quotas universitárias – para fazer valer seus direitos.

Esses exemplos também deixam bem claro que o direito pode ter um caráter reverso. Inventemos um nome: eto-mortífero… eto-paralisante… Ou seja: as engrenagens jurídicas podem “engessar” a criação ou a modificação de novos êthos, de novas formas de vida, pois há forças “conservadoras” que mantem o laço social fixo, tal como está. Pior: avesso à qualquer mudança. Sabemos como essas conquistas são demoradas, são “forçadas”. Não se realizam da noite para o dia. É isso que interessa pesquisar, não? Quais são as forças aqui pró e contra o etopoético? O que impede e o que promove essa mudança no laço social, no nosso modo de ser?

Fábio Belo