Maya Krishnan, (2025) “Over-intelligibility”, Political Philosophy 2(2).
doi: https://doi.org/10.16995/pp.24931
Abstract
Contemporary philosophers have argued that framing new concepts can bring about both moral and epistemic progress. In this paper, I argue that such intelligibility also has downsides. This paper introduces the phenomenon of ‘over-intelligibility,’ which obtains when a concept truly applies and facilitates understanding, yet hinders someone as a knower. This takes place when concepts normalize or detrimentally standardize our epistemic lives.
Keywords:
hermeneutic injustice, epistemic injustice, intelligibility
Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order.
—Michel Foucault
If I knew who or what I were, I would not write….
—Gillian Rose
Foucault News 