Foucault News

News and resources on French thinker Michel Foucault (1926-1984)

Gonzalez Rey, F.
Subjectivity in debate: Some reconstructed philosophical premises to advance its discussion in psychology
(2019) Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 49 (2), pp. 212-234.

DOI: 10.1111/jtsb.12200

Abstract
The topic of subjectivity has been treated peripherally by philosophy. It has appeared in philosophy not as a specific human phenomenon, but attached to other concepts without specifying its ontological definition, such as intersubjectivity, the place of the Other in the emergence of the self, consciousness and so forth. This paper reconstructs some of the overlooked moments and ideas of several classical philosophers, such as Marx, Dewey, Merleau Ponty, Cassirer and Foucault, in order to identify in their works important antecedents to advance a different concept of subjectivity. The concepts and questions which are raised by those philosophers and which are revived in this paper have remained overlooked both by philosophy and psychology because of the lack of any representation of subjectivity capable of making them more visible. The ontological monopoly of language and discourse in explaining all human phenomena, taken together with the critique of theoretical systems and of epistemology, has found in social constructionism its strongest expression in psychology. The value of theoretical systems in generating intelligibility about complex and configurational phenomena is recovered, along with the need to develop new epistemologies capable of generating intelligibility on such systems. Finally, I argue that a new theoretical and epistemological avenue is opened up for the development of psychological thought. © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Author Keywords
cultural-historical approach; philosophy; psychology; subjectivity; symbolical realities

Index Keywords
article, epistemology, human, human experiment, language, psychology, speech intelligibility, theoretical study

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